What exactly is the American strategy on China? And why does Washington get much better press than Brussels on how the two blocs handle China?
I have a column out today that takes a broadly positive view of the European Union’s strategy on China. That strategy seems to me the brightest line of the struggling new geopolitical Union being developed in Brussels. The column goes some way towards explaining why that is the case, but I wanted to add a couple points directly related to how the EU compares to the United States when it comes to China.
Well, the essential point, it seems to me, is that Washington still lacks a strategy. I am not talking about the erratic policy of the Trump years. The problem has persisted and it was there before Trump.
Would you be able to say what the US wants from its China policy? To be tough, it seems. But tough with what purpose? Does it want China to apologize for all its faults in order to get back in Washington’s graces? Does it want the existing Chinese regime to collapse as the Soviet Union collapsed, so that China can live under some copy or other of a Western liberal democracy? (Not that it worked for the Soviet Union’s successor state).
Or does it merely want China to refrain from military adventurism abroad, especially across the Taiwan strait?
The truth is that no one knows, not even the people crafting the policy. They look to the past, disagree with the previous approach and have embarked on a different course. But the future remains a dark abyss.
There is an interesting question following from this: why does Washington get much better press than Brussels on their respective China strategies? In my conversations with Brussels officials this week I heard one incessant complain: America has clout in the “war of ideas.” The European Union does not.
When Ursula von der Leyen and Charles Michel publicly announced a new investment treaty with China last December, they sounded cheerful, even buoyant, but in the following weeks the EU was universally derided for the decision by think tanks, lawmakers, and commentators.
“There was an intention behind this,” a senior official in Brussels told me this week, while requesting to remain anonymous in order to speak freely. This official made it clear that none of these critics wish to harm the EU. What they want — and some may not even be fully conscious of the fact — is to “constrain its autonomy and limit the EU’s ability to pursue its economic interests.” The transatlantic community continues yo be heavily tilted towards Washington. “We need to become better in the war of ideas,” he added.
The EU always had a PR problem. The old one was an "internal" one, where member states' public has accused the EU of being slow, byzantine, bureaucratic, democracy-deficient, socialistic, and globalistic. That mostly went away with the mess of Brexit and MS outsourcing more and more powers to the EU level.
The new one is "external". The EU does not have the media and think-tanky clout based on organizations with a deep understanding of the EU inner mechanics and EU insider knowledge (politico.eu is the exception here). As a result, the EU utterly fails when its interests are in opposition with interests of the UK or the US, which can count on their media and policy institutions, that they will understand the point-of-view of the UK or the US government and will inevitably misunderstand the EU's point-of-view (examples: EU vaccine exports v. EU vaccine nationalism; AstraZeneca's breach of contract with the EU v. EU losing the court ruling; the CAI deal as being anti-US v. controlling China's labor market and matching access for European companies to what American ones already have).